State v. Bolan Appellant\u27s Brief Dckt. 40458 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
6-21-2013
State v. Bolan Appellant's Brief Dckt. 40458
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"State v. Bolan Appellant's Brief Dckt. 40458" (2013). Not Reported. 1152.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/1152
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THL STATE OF lDAHO 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plain ti ff-Respondent, 
Docket No. 40458-2012 
VS. Ada Co No. CR-FE-2011-18000 
CHRISTINA ALICIA BOLAN, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) Defendant-Appellant. 
Dennis Benjamin 
ISBA# 4199 
OPENING BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth 
Judicial District of the State of Idaho 
In and For the County of Ada 
HONORABLE CHERI C. COPSEY, 
District Judge 
Lawrence Wasden 
~--·-· 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
303 West Bannock 
IDAHO ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Paul Panther 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chic[ Criminal Law Division 
P.O. Box 83720 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, ID 83701 
(208) 343-1000 Boise. ID 83720-0010 
db(c,)nbmlaw.com (208) 334-2400 
Attorneys for Appellant Attorneys for Respondent 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. Table of Authorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 
IL Statement of the Case .................................................... 1 
A. Nature of the Case ................................................. 1 
B. Factual Summary and Statement of Facts ............................... 1 
III. Issues Presented for Review ............................................... 5 
IV. Argument ............................................................. 5 
A. Standard of Review ................................................ 5 
B. The Court Erred by Failing to Sua Sponte Order a Psychological Evaluation .... 7 
C. The Court Erred by Failing to Consider Christina's Mental Illness ........... 9 
V. Conclusion ........................................................... 11 
I. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
STATE CASES 
State v. Durham, 146 Idaho 364, 195 P.3d 723 (Ct. App. 2008) ................................................... 7 
State v. French, 95 Idaho 853,522 P.2d 61 (1974) ....................................................................... 7 
State v. Hanson, 152 Idaho 314,271 P.3d 712 (2012) .................................................................. 8 
State v. McFarland, 125 Idaho 876, 876 P.2d 158 (Ct. App. 1994) .......................................... 7, 8 
State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828,264 P.3d 935 (2011) ..................................................................... 6 
State v. Moore, 126 Idaho 208, 880 P.2d 238 (1994) .................................................................... 6 
State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 170 P.3d 387 (2007) .................................................................... 6 
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209,245 P.3d 961 (2010) ...................................................................... 7 
State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 50 P.3d 472 (2002) ...................................................................... 6 
State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565,650 P.2d 707 (Ct. App. 1982) .................................................... 5 
State v. Whipple, 134 Idaho 498, 5 P.3d 478 (Ct. App. 2000) ....................................................... 8 
DOCKETED CASES 
State v. Clinton, No. 38755, 2012 WL 3569687 ............................................................................ 7 
State v. Quintana, -Idaho-, -P.3d-, 2013 WL 2382526 (Ct. App. June 3, 2013) ......... 6, 11 
STATE STATUTES 
LC. § 19-2522 ................................................................................................................ 2, 5, 6, 8, 9 
LC. § 19-2523 .................................................................................................................. 6, 7, 9, 11 
LC. § 19-2524 ................................................................................................................................ 2 
11 
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from the imposition of sentence and the later relinquishment of 
jurisdiction. Appellant Christina Bolan asks this Court to vacate the sentence imposed and 
remand for resentencing. 
B. Procedural History and Statement of Facts 
A search warrant was executed at Christina's home and "two baggies containing 
methamphetamine residue and a baggie with a small amount of marijuana" was found in the 
chest of drawers in her bedroom. Another baggie with amphetamine residue was found in her 
closet. Presentence Report ("PSI"), pg. 2. She was charged by Information with one felony 
(Possession of a Controlled Substance, to wit: Methamphetamine and/or Amphetamine), and two 
misdemeanors (Possession of Marijuana and Possession of Drug Paraphernalia). CR 23-24. In 
exchange for pleading guilty to the felony count, the state agreed to dismiss the misdemeanors 
and to recommend a six year sentence, with two years determinate, but also agreed to recommend 
that she be placed on probation and ordered to serve 180 days in the county jail. T pg. 5, In. 12-
23. In her "Guilty Plea Advisory and Form," Christina revealed that she had been diagnosed 
with mental health disorders, specifically Major Depression Disorder (Recurrent), Anxiety, 
PTSD, ADHD, and Dysthymic Disorder and that she was taking Celexa1• CR 57. 
The court never asked Christina's about her mental health history during the plea 
colloquy or before accepting her guilty plea. While the court ordered a substance abuse 
1 "Celexa ( citalopram) is an antidepressant in a group of drugs called selective serotonin 
reuptake inhibitors (SSRis)." http://www.drugs.com/celexa.html. 
evaluation pursuant to LC.§ 19-2524 as part of the Presentence Investigation, T pg. 12, ln. 9-18, 
it did not order a Mental Health Evaluation pursuant to LC. § 19-2522. 
The PSI noted that Christina was currently 26 years old. She abandoned by her father 
when she was three years old. When she was 13, her mother went to prison for drug dealing. At 
first, according to a Juvenile Probation Officer's Report, Christina tried to live with a family 
friend and then with her father. Neither one would allow her to stay. "She then stayed at several 
different homes in the area, during that time; Gary Hamby raped her. Mr. Hamby was convicted 
and is currently on probation." Id. Between 13 and 16, when her mother was locked up, 
"Christina was in and out of foster homes and shelters." She advised that one of the foster homes 
she gave sex and sexual favors to her foster father and foster brother for cigarettes, drugs and 
alcohol. PSI, pg. 5-6. She lived with an aunt in Pennsylvania for a year, but returned to Idaho, 
"scared and depressed" and "began living in the Hays Shelter Home." Id. 
Christina told the Pre-Sentence Investigatior that she had been "[i]n and out of mental 
ward. Moved home. Thought my life was under control until my 3rd daughter died." PSI, pg. 6. 
Christina also reported having trouble maintaining employment due to her "PTSD[,] ADHD 
[and] Depression." PSI, pg. 11. In 2000, she tried to kill herself by a drug overdose and after she 
was committed to State Hospital South, she attempted to hang herself. PSI, pg. 11. The records 
from State Hospital South indicate that Christina voluntarily admitted herself in 2000. PSI, pg. 
67. She was diagnosed with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, Conduct Disorder, and Major-
Depressive Disorder, recurrent type. PSI, pg. 71. She discharged with prescriptions for Zoloft, 
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Seroquel and Effexor2• She told the Pre-Sentence Investigator that she had been diagnosed with 
the mental illness noted above by Drs. DeLawyer and Nielson from Intermountain Hospital and 
that she had started taking Celexa while in the jail. Dysthymia is a serious state of chronic 
depression, less acute and severe than major depressive disorder. Christina also reported that she 
had been admitted to St. Alphonsus Behavior Health in 2009 or 2010. 
The GAIN-I Recommendation and Referral Summary noted the possible presence of 
DSM Axis I Mood Disorder (of the Post-Traumatic or Acute Stress Disorder type) and ADHD, 
but did not note the possible presence of any Axis II Personality Disorders. PSI, pg. 3 7. It 
recommended that a "[r]eferral to mental personnel" be made "for a more detailed assessment 
and consideration of more intensive or alternative types of services." It also recommended 
"[ c ]oordinating care with mental health provider" and "discussing any prior mental health 
treatment experiences with Christina." PSI, pg 41. 
2 Zoloft is an antidepressant which "affects chemicals in the brain that may become 
unbalanced and cause depression, panic, anxiety, or obsessive-compulsive symptoms. Zoloft is 
used to treat depression, obsessive-compulsive disorder, panic disorder, anxiety disorders, 
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and premenstrual dysphoric disorder (PMDD)." 
http://www.drugs.com/zoloft.html. 
Seroquel is an anti psychotic medicine. It works by changing the actions of chemicals in the 
brain." It is used to treat schizophrenia and bipolar disorder. "Scroquel is also used together 
with antidepressant medications to treat major depressive disorder in adults." 
http://www.drugs.com/seroquel.html. 
Effexor is also an antidepressant and is used to treat major depressive disorder, anxiety, and 
panic disorder. http://www.drugs.com/effexor.html. 
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Attached to the PSI was a 2012 psychological examination prepared by David DeLawyer, 
Ph.D., a clinical psychologist, upon a referral from the Department of Health & Welfare after 
H&W had removed Christina's three children from her care due to her arrest in this case. PSI pg. 
81-96. Dr. DeLawyer concluded that Christina had "experienced an extremely difficult and 
traumatic childhood" which had a "significant impact on her psychological development and 
continues to influence her psychological functioning as an adult." PSI, pg. 98. He noted that she 
met the diagnostic criteria for Major Depressive Disorder and Generalized Anxiety Disorder. He 
also observed that while Christina "denied specific and important symptoms associated with Post 
Traumatic Stress Disorder, she acknowledged many others. In the examiner's opinion, whether 
or not she meets the fully criteria for PTSD, she continues to be substantially impacted by her 
history of abuse and trauma as a child as well as the more recent death of her infant daughter." 
PSI, pg. 99. Dr. DeLawyer also noted that Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder should be 
considered a rule out diagnosis as Christina "reported substantial problems with inattention and 
follow though." Id. 
Dr. DeLawyer concluded that Christina needs to "complete her substance abuse treatment 
program," and "could potentially benefit from taking a cognitive self-change class during her 
treatment to address some of the thinking errors she experiences with regard to trusting others 
and paranoid ideas." Id. In addition, he concluded that Christina "requires extensive mental 
health treatment" beginning with "consideration for psychotropic medication to treat her 
substantial depression and anxiety symptoms," noting that "[r]elief from such symptoms could 
help her achieve emotional stability and improve her daily functioning and effectiveness a great 
deal." PSI, pg. 100. Finally, he noted that Christina "also requires psychotherapy to treat the 
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anxiety and depression." Id. 
At sentencing, both parties recommended a suspended sentence and probation. T pg. 21, 
In. 14-20; pg. 23, 1. 18-19. The court, however, imposed a six year sentence with two years 
fixed, but retained jurisdiction and recommended Christina be placed in Correctional Alternative 
Placement Program. T pg. 29; 6-22. The court later relinquished jurisdiction and allowed the six 
year sentence to go into effect. T pg. 39, ln. 6-15. The court never ordered an LC.§ 19-2522 
psychological evaluation. It also never mentioned Christina's history of mental illness during 
either the sentencing or the rider review hearing. 
This appeal timely followed. LCR 18. 
III. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the court err by failing to sua sponte order a psychological evaluation pursuant to 
LC. § 19-2522? 
2. Did the court err by failing to consider Christina's mental illness when fashioning the 
sentence? 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. Standard of Review 
This Court reviews sentences under the abuse of discretion standard. On appeal, the 
appellant has the burden to show an abuse of discretion. A sentence may be an abuse of 
discretion if it is unreasonable upon the facts of the case. A sentence of confinement is 
reasonable when it appears at the time of sentencing that confinement is necessary "to 
accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related 
goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution applicable to a given case." State v. Too hill, 103 
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Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982). When reviewing the length of a sentence, 
this Court considers the defendant's entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 
P.3d 387, 391 (2007). 
The sentencing court must take the defendant's mental condition into account in setting a 
sentence. State v. Quintana, -Idaho-, -P.3d-, 2013 WL 2382526 (Ct. App. June 3, 
2013), citing LC.§ 19-2523; State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828,834,264 P.3d 935,941 (2011); 
State v. Moore, 126 Idaho 208, 211, 880 P.2d 238,241 (1994). 
Specifically, Idaho Code§ 19-2523 requires the court to look at several factors: 
(a) The extent to which the defendant is mentally ill; 
(b) The degree of illness or defect and level of functional impairment; 
( c) The prognosis for improvement or rehabilitation; 
(d) The availability of treatment and level of care required; 
(e) Any risk of danger which the defendant may create for the public, if at 
large, or the absence of such risk; 
(f) The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the wrongfulness of his 
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law at the time 
of the offense charged. 
LC.§ 19-2523(1)(a}-(f). A defendant's mental health is only one of the factors 
that must be considered and weighed by the court at sentencing; the statute does 
not require that a defendant's mental condition be the controlling factor at 
sentencing, nor does it require the district court to specifically reference all of the 
factors. However, the record must show the court adequately considered the 
substance of the factors when it imposed the sentence. 
Id, citing State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828, 836, 264 P.3d 935, 943 (2011) and State v. Strand, 137 
Idaho 457,461, 50 P.3d 472,476 (2002). 
In order for it to adequately consider a defendant's mental illness as required by§ 19-
2523(1), a court must order a psychological evaluation pursuant to LC. § 19-2522(1), if there is 
reason to believe that the mental condition of the defendant will be a significant factor at 
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sentencing, such as when the court needs to determine whether to authorize psychological 
treatment during a defendant's confinement or probation. See LC. § 19-2523(2); State v. 
Durham, 146 Idaho 364, 366, 195 P.3d 723, 725 (Ct. App. 2008), citing State v. French, 95 
Idaho 853,855,522 P.2d 61, 63 (1974); State v. AfcFarland, 125 Idaho 876,880,876 P.2d 158, 
162 (Ct. App. 1994). A psychological evaluation also aids the district court in its decision 
whether to allow probation and also to determine the appropriate length of the sentence. 
Durham, 146 Idaho at 371, 195 P.3d at 730. However, "lw]herc a defendant fails to request a 
psychological evaluation or object to the PSI on the ground that an evaluation has not been 
performed, the defendant must demonstrate that by failing to order a psychological evaluation the 
sentencing court manifestly disregarded the provisions of f.C.R. 32." Durham, supra.3 
B. The Court Erred by Failing to Sua Sponte Order a Psychological Evaluation 
Here, in light of the information provided to the court in the Guilty Plea Questionnaire 
and in the PSI, including the Health & Welfare psychological assessment, there was substantial 
reason to believe that the mental condition of Ms. Bolan would be a significant factor at 
sentencing. "[W]hen the record shows a defendant has a substantial history of serious mental 
3 Defense counsel neither requested a psychological evaluation nor objected to the 
court's failure to order one. Thus, Christina raises the issue for the first time on appeal. 
Unfortunately, it is not clear whether the Durham manifest disregard test or the fundamental 
error set forth in State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209,245 P.3d 961 (2010), applies in this context. The 
Court of Appeals in State v. Clinton, No. 38755, 2012 WL 3569687 (Idaho Ct. App. Aug. 20, 
2012) wrote that "until the Idaho Supreme Court addresses the issue, in cases of unobjected-to 
error in regard to the ordering of a psychological evaluation for use in sentencing, this Court will 
continue to apply the manifest disregard standard." This decision docs not have precedential 
value, however, because the Supreme Court has accepted review in Clinton and that case is set 
for oral argument on August 27, 2013. Nevertheless, Christina will assume for purposes of this 
brief that the manifest disregard test still applies for the reasons set forth in the Clinton Court of 
Appeals opinion. 
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illness, the defendant's mental condition will be a significant factor in determining an appropriate 
sentence and I.C. § 19-2522 requires the sentencing court to obtain a psychological evaluation 
prior to sentencing." State v. Hanson, 152 Idaho 314,320,271 P.3d 712,718 (2012). 
While it appeared that both parties anticipated that Ms. Bolan's sentence would be 
suspended and she would be granted probation, the PSI had grave misgivings about Ms. Bolan's 
ability to be successful on probation. PSI pg. 13. The sentencing court shared this concern and 
did not seriously consider immediately placing Ms. Bolan on probation at sentencing. The court 
stated: "In reading this presentence report, it is clear that ifl simply put you on probation, you're 
not going to do well. ... I'm telling you you will not succeed and what will happen is you will 
make things worse than they are already .... [R]ight now I don't think you're ready for drug 
court." T pg. 28, ln. 11-17; 21-22. Thus, Ms. Bolan's mental health history was important 
because her chronic depression, anxiety and symptoms of PTSD were impediments to her 
successfully completing probation. If the court had a psychological evaluation, it might have 
considered the alternative of mental health court for Ms. Bolan instead of drug court, or it might 
have considered the possibility of retaining jurisdiction with a recommendation that Christina be 
placed in the Therapeutic Community rider program. 
Christina acknowledges that Dr. DeLawyer' s Health and Welfare report was included in 
the PSI. And this Court has held that a new evaluation is not required if information contained in 
existing reports before the sentencing court satisfies I. C. § 19-2522(3). State v. Whipple, 134 
Idaho 498,506, 5 P.3d 478,486 (Ct. App. 2000); State v. McFarland, 125 Idaho 876, 879, 876 
P.2d 158, 161 (Ct. App. 1994). However, that report was not an adequate substitute for a§ 19-
2522 report because it did not include an analysis of the relative risks and benefits of treatment or 
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nontreatment, or a consideration of the risk of danger which the defendant may create for the 
public if at large, considerations which are required to be addressed in a § 19-2522 evaluation. In 
addition, the Health and Welfare evaluation does not address whether Christina's mental illness 
played a role in her offense, perhaps by being an attempt to self-medicate and thus alleviate the 
symptoms of her disorders. See LC. § 19-2523 ("In determining the sentence to be imposed in 
addition to other criteria provided by law, if the defendant's mental condition is a significant 
factor, the court shall consider such factors as: .... (f) The capacity of the defendant to appreciate 
the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law at the time 
of the offense charged.") 
In sum, the Health and Welfare evaluation was inadequate to satisfy the requirements of 
LC. § 19-2522, because it did not address all the statutory factors. And, in light of the 
information contained in the Guilty Plea Questionnaire and in the PSI regarding Christina's 
mental health problems, the court manifestly disregarded the requirements of Rule 32 when it 
failed to sua sponte order a psychological evaluation for use at sentencing. Therefore, the 
sentence should be vacated and the matter remanded for resentencing. 
C. The Court Erred by Failing to Consider Christina's Mental Illness 
The court also erred by totally failing to take Christina's mental health into account at 
sentencing. It was not mentioned by the court and there is no indication in the record that it was 
considered in setting the six year sentence. There was no mention of Christina's possible 
learning disability, there was no mention of her chronic depression, there was no mention of her 
anxiety disorder and there was no mention of post-traumatic stress disorder. As to the traumatic 
events in Christina's life, the court offered the following home-spun advice: 
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Ms. Bolan, I read this carefully and that right now a large part of your past is 
holding you back. Okay? But that's because you're letting it. Believe it or not 
you can choose to put it aside. Okay? 
And I know your - you're saying yes, but I don't really think you understand what 
I mean .... There are a lot of people who have really bad things in their 
background. Really bad. In fact, if you look around this room, you may find 
you'll be surprised who some of those people are. You can't always tell. You 
have a choice; you can either let the things in your past drag you down or you can 
rise above them. 
T pg. 26, ln. 1-17. The court went on to tell Christina that she was driving down the freeway but 
"instead of looking forward, you've got you're head turned backwards" and she needed to stop 
"looking backward at [her] past" because she was "setting [herself] up for failure." T pg. 26, ln. 
23 - pg. 27, ln. 2-7. 
Of course, the court's advice that Christina put her past in the rear view mirror and drive 
full-tilt down the freeway of life is psychologically naive. No competent psychologist would 
suggest Christina forget about her past which included being abandoned by her father, being 
placed in foster care after her mother went to prison for drug dealing; being raped; being sexually 
exploited by, among others, a foster father and brother, and the death of her young daughter. In 
fact, Dr. DeLawyer offered the exact opposite advice in his 2012 psychological evaluation: 
Therapy also needs to address her history of trauma. Ms. Bolan believes that it is 
not necessary or prudent to treat this history and it would be best to simply let it 
lie. While such beliefs are common in trauma victims and seem to make sense in 
the short term, it is the examiner's opinion that Ms. Bolan will continue to be 
impacted psychologically by this history until it is addressed. It has the potential 
to continue to influence her emotional stability, increase her risk for substance 
abuse relapse and increase her risk for returning to an unhealthy relationship. 
Taking the grief and loss and the trauma classes/groups at her substance abuse 
treatment programs are important first steps in addressing this history, but further 
individual treatment by someone experienced in trauma will be necessary. 
PSI, pg. I 00. 
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In light of its comments, it appears that the court failed to even consider Dr. DeLawyer' s 
report in setting the sentence even though it was in the PSI and available for review. In addition, 
the court failed to follow the requirements of I.C. § 19-2523 because it did not consider: (a) the 
extent to which Christina is mentally ill; (b) the degree of her illness or defect and the level of her 
functional impairment; (c) her prognosis for improvement or rehabilitation; (d) the availability of 
treatment and level of care required; ( e) any risk of danger which Christina may create for the 
public, if at large, or the absence of such risk; or (f) the capacity of Christina to appreciate the 
wrongfulness of her conduct or to conform her conduct to the requirements of law at the time of 
the offense charged. Unlike in Strand, Miller and Quintana, the district court here did not 
indicate that it had reviewed and considered the evaluations attached to the PSI report, as well as 
other relevant information in the report; nor did it discuss the findings therein. Thus, the record 
here does not show that the court adequately considered the substance of the § 19-2523 factors 
when it imposed the sentence and it should be vacated pursuant to State v. Quintana, supra. 
V. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, this Court should vacate the sentence and remand for a 
new sentencing hearing. 
. s-t-
Respectfully submitted this~ day of June, 2013. 
b~~~ . \ ~--'----=---
Dennis Benjami~~ 
Attorney for Christina Bolan 
11 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
. ~r 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this :ll day of June, 2013, caused two true and 
correct copies of the foregoing document to be placed in the United States mail, postage prepaid, 
addressed to: 
Idaho Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0010 
~"-~LAC-----
Dennis Benjamin l 
12 
